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 This piece, which is in three parts, will revisit the importation of fairness 
into the employment contract (outside and independent of the fairness-
based provisions of our labour legislation) by a line of Supreme Court of 
Appeal (SCA) judgments during the 2000s. This process culminated in 
the recognition of an "implied duty of fair dealing" in the common-law 
employment contract. This piece will discuss such developments, will 
argue that such an implied duty still forms part of our law (despite 
apparent consensus in the literature that the SCA turned its back on such 
earlier judgments), will critically examine some of the arguments for and 
against the recognition of such a duty, and will then consider the issue 
within the broader context of the role of good faith and fairness in our 
general law of contract. 
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1 Introduction 
It is trite that employment relationships in South Africa are very heavily 
regulated by means of labour legislation. One of the primary objects of such 
legislation is to infuse the individual employment relationship and collective 
labour relations with fairness, something that was traditionally not highly 
prized by the common law of contract, and which seldom featured in the 
application of its sometimes archaic and one-sided rules and principles. The 
labour legislation was passed in order to give effect to the right to fair labour 
practices as guaranteed in section 23 of the Constitution of the Republic of 
South Africa, 1996 (hereafter the Constitution). And our courts, when 
developing the common law, must promote the spirit, purport and objects of 
the Bill of Rights.1 Our courts are obliged, in applying the Bill of Rights and in 
order to give effect to a right in the Bill, to apply or if necessary develop the 
common law to the extent that legislation does not give effect to that right.2  
All of this is trite, but some issues regarding the role of the common law of 
contract in the context of the employment contract are not. One such issue, 
which will be the focus here, is the role of good faith and good faith dealing 
in the contractual relationship between employer and employee. Allied to this 
is the role of fairness, or equity, in this relationship, something that in recent 
years has increasingly also engaged the attention of general contract law 
scholars as well as the courts. 
In this piece (which is in three parts)3 I will revisit a debate that raged a few 
years ago in the academic literature and the courts, and which seems to have 
died down of late, although remaining extremely relevant to our system of 
labour law and of labour dispute resolution. More ambitiously, I hope that this 
piece will rekindle the debate on an issue which I believe is potentially 
important for the development of our employment law in the constitutional 
dispensation. In fact, I believe that the issue under discussion here may be a 
central (and indispensable) string to the bow of the constitutional guarantee 
of fair labour practices, and would contribute greatly to the achievement of 
the vision of the drafters of both the Constitution and our labour legislation. I 
                                            
*  Van Staden and Smit 2010 TSAR 712. 
**  Andre M Louw. BA LLB LLM LLD (Stellenbosch). Associate Professor, Faculty of Law, 
Stellenbosch University, South Africa. E-mail: alouw@sun.ac.za. I wish to express my 
sincere thanks to my colleague, Christoph Garbers, for his very helpful comments on 
an earlier draft of this piece. 
1  Section 39(2) of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996 (hereafter the 
Constitution). 
2  Section 8(3) of the Constitution. 
3  Also see Louw 2018 (21) PER / PELJ Parts 2 & 3. 
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will track the development of the notion of an implied "duty of fair dealing"4 in 
the employment contract, a supposed source for fairness in 
employer/employee relations, which derives from the common law rather 
than the labour legislation. This exposition will cover developments in case 
law (primarily in a line of judgments by the Supreme Court of Appeal (SCA), 
which were rendered in the decade before this court was stripped of its 
jurisdiction in labour law matters5) as well as academic commentary. 
Ultimately, I will argue in favour of the recognition of such a duty as a form of 
constitutional development of the common law relating to the employment 
contract, based on the labour law cases and commentary to be considered, 
as well as on related developments regarding the role of substantive equity 
in the broader law of contract, outside of employment law.  
But I need to include one important disclaimer: Despite the focus here on the 
role of the common-law employment contract, this piece is not intended 
(primarily) to revisit the debate on the "jurisdictional quagmire" caused by the 
dual avenues for labour disputes arising from either the employment contract 
or in terms of the labour legislation. The primary source of such a system of 
dual avenues for employment disputes is section 77(3) of the Basic 
Conditions of Employment Act 75 of 1997 (BCEA), which provides as follows: 
The Labour Court has concurrent jurisdiction with the civil courts to hear and 
determine any matter concerning a contract of employment, irrespective of 
whether any basic condition of employment constitutes a term of that contract. 
In the context of unfair dismissal and unfair labour practice disputes, section 
195 of the Labour Relations Act 66 of 1995 (LRA) provides as follows: 
An order or award of compensation made in terms of this Chapter is in addition 
to, and not a substitute for, any other amount to which the employee is entitled 
in terms of any law, collective agreement or contract of employment. 
These provisions, read separately and in conjunction, clearly show that 
contractual rights arising from the common law remain enforceable, and that 
civil courts may adjudicate disputes about such rights even though such 
disputes would emanate from the employment relationship. While some 
continue to criticise the failure of the legislature to remove the concurrent 
                                            
4  In the words of Cameron JA (as he then was) in Murray v Minister of Defence 2009 3 
SA 130 (SCA) para 5 (hereafter the Murray case). 
5  The Constitution Seventeenth Amendment Act of 2012 amended s 168(3) of the 
Constitution. Section 168(3) now provides as follows: "(a) The Supreme Court of 
Appeal may decide appeals in any matter arising from the High Court of South Africa 
or a court of a status similar to the High Court of South Africa, except in respect of 
labour or competition matters to such an extent as may be determined by an Act of 
Parliament." 
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jurisdiction provisions from the labour legislation (arguing in favour of 
exclusive jurisdiction for the Commission for Conciliation, Mediation and 
Arbitration (CCMA) and Labour Courts in all employment-related matters),6 I 
will proceed from the premise that the approach of the SCA in Makhanya v 
University of Zululand7 on the jurisdiction of civil courts in disputes arising 
from the contract of employment has largely settled the issue.8 Conduct by a 
party to the employment relationship or an event (for example, the termination 
of employment) may give rise to more than one cause of action, either under 
the common law of contract or in terms of the labour legislation, and the civil 
courts retain jurisdiction to consider breach of contract claims related to an 
employment contract (as the SCA confirmed in a line of cases).9 When such 
a contract-based claim is brought before the civil courts, it is not a question 
of whether the court enjoys jurisdiction, but rather of whether the claim is 
good or bad in law (that is, whether the claimed cause of action exists). 
Accordingly, my focus will be on the more substantive question relating to the 
content of the common-law contract of employment, rather than on 
jurisdiction in contract-based claims emanating from the employment 
relationship.10 
                                            
6  See eg Van Eck and Mathiba 2014 ILJ 863. 
7  Makhanya v University of Zululand 2009 30 ILJ 1539 (SCA) (hereafter the Makhanya 
case). 
8  Even though some commentators have continued to forcefully criticise the currently 
still-existing situation of dual avenues for employment-related disputes – see Du Toit 
2010 ILJ 21. 
9  Fedlife Assurance Ltd v Wolfaardt 2002 1 SA 49 (SCA) (hereafter the Fedlife case); 
the Makhanya case; SA Maritime Safety Authority v McKenzie 2010 3 SA 601 (SCA) 
(hereafter the McKenzie case). 
10  I am generally in agreement with the sentiments expressed by Froneman J in Nakin v 
MEC Department of Education, Eastern Cape Province 2008 6 SA 320 (Ck), in support 
of the role of the civil courts in developing constitutionally-compliant labour 
jurisprudence: "The coherence of an emerging labour and employment jurisprudence 
is not primarily or necessarily determined by its development in one exclusive forum, 
but rather by the degree to which it gives proper expression to the constitutional 
entitlement of everyone, in terms of section 23(1) of the Constitution, to fair labour 
practices. Approached from that perspective the question that needs to be asked is 
whether the coherence of employment law has gained or lost from administrative law 
insights relating to employment in the public sector, or from the development of the 
common-law contract of employment to incorporate in its fabric some aspects of the 
constitutional right to fair labour practices. Opinions may differ on this, but my own 
view is that developments are leading to greater coherence in employment 
jurisprudence, not to divergence and parallel systems of law. If that is the case, does 
it matter as a matter of substance rather than form where the development takes place, 
in the civil courts or in the labour court? For example, the incorporation of the right to 
a pre-dismissal hearing as part of a constitutionally developed common-law contract 
of employment in Gumbi and even the further extension of the common-law contract 
of employment to include a right to a pre-transfer hearing for public employees in 
Giyose are in my respectful judgment, positive rather than negative developments. 
The way in which those developments came about and could be channelled in future, 
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Having mentioned that the debate regarding fairness in the common law 
employment contract appears to have died down, and also having referred to 
the opposition from some quarters to the continued role of the civil courts in 
hearing contractual claims deriving from employment contracts, it needs to 
be stressed that these issues are not moot, not by a long chalk. Parties to 
employment contracts still take contract-based claims to the courts with 
varying degrees of success – compare South African Football Association v 
Mangope (a claim for damages for the unlawful breach of a fixed-term 
employment contract),11 Ramabulana v Pilansberg Platinum Mines (a claim 
for an order for specific performance in the form of reinstatement to enforce 
a contractual right to a pre-dismissal hearing),12 KwaZulu-Natal Tourism 
Authority v Wasa (a claim for damages for the breach of contract under the 
BCEA),13 and Randwater v Stoop (a claim for damages by an employer 
                                            
might also allay much of the fear about the adverse consequences of forum-shopping 
and the potential to create two parallel systems of law in the employment field ... [A]s 
far as the development of the common-law contract of employment in accordance with 
the Constitution is concerned, the beneficial insights have mostly been flowing to the 
civil courts from developments in the Labour Court and from the concretisation of fair 
labour standards in labour legislation and general employment practices, not the other 
way round. The recognition of a contractual pre-dismissal right in Gumbi is again a 
good example. Development of the common law to bring it in line with the constitutional 
ethos may often follow legislative advances which pave the way for such new thinking. 
To insulate the development of the common-law contract of employment by 
compartmentalising and narrowing not only the constitutional right upon which such 
development might occur, but also to state that any such development may not occur 
in the general courts of the land in addition to specialised courts, runs counter to the 
constitutional objective of ensuring that the judiciary in general has a duty to play its 
part in effecting the constitutional transformation of our society." As regards the policy 
considerations behind the specialist dispute resolution scheme as established in terms 
of the labour legislation, and the potential impact of Chirwa v Transnet 2008 4 SA 367 
(CC) on the question whether the legislature's intention with its establishment was to 
oust the jurisdiction of the civil courts in labour matters, see also the following from the 
judgment of Van Niekerk J in Mogothle v Premier of the Northwest Province 2009 30 
ILJ 605 (LC) para 25: "My conclusion that Chirwa does not have the effect of confining 
an employee only to the remedies provided by the LRA (thus precluding an employee 
from seeking to enforce any contractual remedy) does not fly in the face of the policy 
reasons that underpin the concern, expressed in the judgments of the majority of the 
Constitutional Court in Chirwa, to protect the integrity of the system of conciliation, 
arbitration and adjudication within specialist structures, a system agreed to by the 
social partners, after a careful balancing of competing interests. The BCEA, enacted 
some two years after the LRA, is just as much the product of negotiation by the social 
partners, and the Act represents as much of a finely balanced compromise as the 
LRA. When the social partners agreed to the terms of section 77(3) of the BCEA, they 
acknowledged that disputes concerning contracts of employment had not been 
eclipsed by the LRA, and that this court ought appropriately to be conferred with 
powers to determine contractual disputes, concurrently with the civil courts." 
11  South African Football Association v Mangope 2013 34 ILJ 311 (LAC). 
12  Ramabulana v Pilansberg Platinum Mines 2015 36 ILJ 2333 (LC). 
13  KwaZulu-Natal Tourism Authority v Wasa 2016 37 ILJ 2581 (LAC). 
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against an employee).14 The contractual element of the employment contract 
and contractual remedies for the breach of such contracts have survived the 
establishment of legislative rights and remedies. Labour lawyers should not 
underestimate the role of the common law of the employment contract, and 
it bears close and constant consideration in the context of the regulation of 
the employment relationship. 
This piece is in three parts. The section (section 2) that follows in this part, 
Part 1, will briefly sketch the broader context for the topic under discussion 
here, which is very much concerned with the interaction between the main 
sources of our labour law within the one system of law introduced by the 
Constitution. In section 3 I will examine the judicial pronouncements and 
academic opinions on the subject of good faith and the duty of fair dealing in 
the employment contract. It will cover the main SCA judgments on this issue, 
which include Fedlife Assurance Ltd v Wolfaardt and Murray v Minister of 
Defence. In Part 2, I will critically consider the SCA's judgment in SA Maritime 
Safety Authority v McKenzie, which has commonly been interpreted (in my 
view, wrongly) as having brought an end to the importation of terms regarding 
fairness into the employment contract.15 I will then consider where we 
currently are following McKenzie. In Part 3 I will discuss some of the 
perceived deficiencies of the labour legislation (specifically the LRA and the 
BCEA) in sufficiently giving effect to all employees' right to fair labour 
practices, and I will also engage with some of the most popular arguments 
against the recognition of an implied duty of fair dealing in the employment 
contract and explain why we need it. Throughout, I will argue in favour of the 
recognition of such a duty as a necessary development of the common law 
of the employment contract in line with section 8(3) of the Bill of Rights in 
order to give effect to the constitutional right to fair labour practices. I will 
conclude with a discussion of the reasons for the recognition of such a duty 
of fair dealing. In section 3 of Part 3 I will then examine the issue in the context 
of developments regarding the role of good faith and substantive fairness in 
the broader, general law of contract, and its implications for the employment 
relationship. Section 4 in Part 3 will summarise the discussion in parts 1-3 
and conclude. 
2 The rules of the game in the new legal order 
The introduction of the constitutional dispensation has of course 
fundamentally and irrevocably altered all aspects of our legal system. This is 
                                            
14  Randwater v Stoop 2013 34 ILJ 579 (LAC). 
15  Van Niekerk and Smit Law@Work 98.  
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evident in labour law as much as it is in other branches of law. And this is 
especially relevant for the present purposes in evaluating the interaction 
between legislation and the common law (and the Constitution). O' Regan J, 
in Bato Star Fishing (Pty) Ltd v Minister of Environmental Affairs and 
Tourism,16 expressed the nature of such interaction in the context of 
administrative law: 
In Pharmaceutical Manufacturers Association of SA and Another: In Re Ex 
Parte President of the Republic of South Africa and Others, the question of the 
relationship between the common law grounds of review and the Constitution 
was considered by this Court. A unanimous Court held that under our new 
constitutional order the control of public power is always a constitutional matter. 
There are not two systems of law regulating administrative action — the 
common law and the Constitution — but only one system of law grounded in 
the Constitution. The courts' power to review administrative action no longer 
flows directly from the common law but from [the Promotion of Administrative 
Justice Act 3 of 2000, or PAJA] and the Constitution itself. The grundnorm of 
administrative law is now to be found in the first place not in the doctrine of ultra 
vires, nor in the doctrine of parliamentary sovereignty, nor in the common law 
itself, but in the principles of our Constitution. The common law informs the 
provisions of PAJA and the Constitution, and derives its force from the latter. 
The extent to which the common law remains relevant to administrative review 
will have to be developed on a case-by-case basis as the courts interpret and 
apply the provisions of PAJA and the Constitution.17 
The same undoubtedly applies to the interaction between the common law of 
the employment contract and the labour legislation (for example, the LRA). 
The touchtone for evaluating such interaction in the present context is the 
issue of fairness.  
Fairness, we were told by Cameron J, Froneman J and Majiedt AJ in South 
African Police Service v Solidarity obo Barnard,18 "is a foundational 
constitutional value". In fact, it is "one of the core values of our constitutional 
order",19 and "it is a standard the Constitution recognises in the specific 
context of employment practices".20 Most significantly, our Constitution takes 
the unique step of entrenching a fundamental right to fair labour practices in 
the Bill of Rights. In respect of the importance of section 23, this fundamental 
right must be taken as constituting one of those few core rights which directly 
reflect specific underlying constitutional values (such as section 9's reflection 
of the underlying value of equality, and section 10's reflection of the 
                                            
16  Bato Star Fishing (Pty) Ltd v Minister of Environmental Affairs and Tourism 2004 4 SA 
490 (CC) (hereafter the Bato Star case). 
17  Bato Star case para 22. 
18  South African Police Service v Solidarity obo Barnard 2014 6 SA 123 (CC) (hereafter 
the Barnard case). 
19  Per O' Regan J in Lufuno Mphaphuli & Associates (Pty) Ltd v Andrews 2009 4 SA 529 
(CC) para 221. 
20  Barnard case para 98. 
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underlying value of human dignity). The right to fairness as reflected in 
section 23 is also directly constitutive of the more general underlying value 
system of Ubuntu (which will be referred to in greater detail in Part 3, in the 
context of the developing law of contract).  
Of course, under one system of law, fairness must also find expression in the 
law which derives its force from the Constitution, that is, in both the labour 
legislation and the common law. The key labour statutes, the LRA, the BCEA 
and the Employment Equity Act 55 of 1998 (EEA) are all very fundamentally 
concerned with importing fairness into the employment relationship, 
throughout its various phases. The EEA significantly does so at the stage 
where no employment relationship exists (yet), by protecting even applicants 
for employment from unfair discrimination. During the existence of the 
employment relationship, all three statutes provide in various ways for the 
fairness of labour practices and the conduct of an employer towards its 
employees. The prime example, of course, is the concept of unfair labour 
practices as defined in section 186(2) of the LRA, but other examples 
abound. Compare the "floor of rights" provided for in the BCEA, which 
regulate terms and conditions of employment (such as working hours, leave 
and other issues). And the LRA concerns itself specifically with fairness at 
the termination of the employment relationship, by means of the unfair 
dismissal provisions contained in chapter VIII of the Act. 
Which then poses the question, considering the "one system of law" principle, 
of the extent to which fairness plays (or should play) a role under the common 
law. Is fairness to be the exclusive domain of the legislation? Does the fact 
that the legislation so significantly deals with fairness mean that there is little 
or no room for fairness also to feature through the mechanism of 
(development of) the common law? I am no expert on administrative law, so 
I am not sure, but I would suggest that the common law in that field has been 
more significantly eclipsed by the consolidation of constitutional principles in 
legislation (PAJA) than is the case with labour law. The labour legislation 
frequently refers to the contract of employment, and there is general 
consensus that "the contract of employment and statutory labour law … 
together, form the heart of individual labour law".21 Accordingly, O' Regan J's 
reference in the dictum quoted above from Bato Star to the "extent to which 
the common law remains relevant" would be overstated in the context of 
labour law. The common law is definitely still very relevant.  
                                            
21  Du Toit 2008 SALJ 95. 
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I refer here to the "development of the common law", because the traditional 
understanding, of course, is that the common law of contract gave little if any 
weight to considerations of fairness.22 Parties were constrained in their 
conduct towards each other by the notion of lawfulness. This position 
prevailed for many years and was one of the major reasons for judicial and 
legislative intervention in our labour law (the former, predominantly in the 
form of the erstwhile Industrial Court's fairness-based jurisprudence, which 
was established even before the advent of the Constitution). But the 
Constitution, in its mission to transform all our law in its image, does not 
constrain itself to calling only on the legislature to give effect to the Bill of 
Rights (as it does in the text of some of the fundamental rights, such as 
sections 9(4), 23(5), 23(6), 25(5), 26(2), 27(2), 32(2) and 33(3)). Maybe 
significantly, it does not contain such a call to the legislature in the text of 
section 23(1), as confirmed recently by the Constitutional Court.23 It also 
places a constitutional duty on the courts, which "in order to give effect to a 
right in the Bill, must apply, or if necessary develop, the common law to the 
extent that legislation does not give effect to that right",24 and bearing in mind 
that in such development of the common law the courts must "promote the 
spirit, purport and objects of the Bill of Rights".25 Clearly the common law also 
has a significant role to play in ensuring that all the different sources of law 
which make up the one system of law give effect to the constitutional rights 
and values. And in the present context, this means that the common law also 
has a role to play in importing fairness into the employment relationship. After 
all, when compared to other branches of law, our labour law aims to give 
effect not only to constitutional values, but to an actual constitutional right to 
fairness – this is unique not only compared to labour law regulation in other 
jurisdictions, but it is also unique in comparison with other branches of our 
own law, which lack the express constitutional entrenchment of fairness.26 
                                            
22  As confirmed recently by Zondo J in Food and Allied Workers Union obo Gaoshubelwe 
v Pieman's Pantry (Pty) Limited 2018 5 BCLR 527 (CC) para 79 (hereafter the 
Gaoshubelwe case): "Labour legislation, including the LRA, was a response, in part 
at least, to the inequity against workers inherent in the common law employment 
relationship. Labour legislation was intended to bring about a better dispensation 
which would seek to protect and promote the interests of both employers and 
employees. In other words, labour legislation sought to bring about a new employment 
regime between employers and employees that would seek to strike a balance 
between the interests of employers and those of employees." 
23  Pretorius v Transnet Pension Fund (CC) unreported case number CCT95/17 of 25 
April 2018 para 51. 
24  Section 8(3)(a) of the Constitution.  
25  Section 39(2) of the Constitution. 
26  Section 33 of the Bill of Rights provides a guarantee of administrative action that is, 
amongst other things, procedurally fair. Section 35(3) provides accused persons with 
a right to a fair trial. The section 23 right to fair labour practices is much more 
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When one considers the law of contract generally27 and other specific forms 
of contracts (such as the contract of sale, consumer contracts, insurance 
contracts, building contracts, etcetera) it is pertinent to note that none of these 
contracts exist and function in a milieu that is governed by a discrete 
constitutional right to fairness. This to my mind throws the role of fairness in 
the common law of the employment contract into sharp relief. The 
development of the common law (and how this is accomplished by the 
judiciary) is the focus of this piece, specifically in respect of one prime 
mechanism through which such development takes place, namely the 
importation of terms (regarding fairness) into the employment contract. 
A detailed exposition of the meaning and nature of implied terms (and the 
naturalia of a contract) is beyond the scope of this piece. Essentially, this 
piece will consider one specific such implied term, namely an implied duty of 
fairness (or fair dealing), which places a duty on the contracting parties to 
conduct themselves within certain parameters of equity and to refrain from 
unfair conduct which might harm or destroy the relationship between the 
parties. A breach of such an implied term would be a breach of contract, and 
may lead to contractual remedies (such as an order for specific performance 
or a claim for contractual damages). The implied term is one that, unlike a 
tacit term which derives from the actual but unexpressed intention of the 
parties, is implied by the working of the law (that is, it is an externally-imposed 
term of the contract, which may be implied for a number of reasons – for 
example, in order to give business efficacy to the contract, or to promote the 
public interest, or to give effect to the spirit, purport and objects of the Bill of 
Rights). Implied terms which appear in certain nominate contracts (such as 
contracts of sale, consumer contracts or contracts of employment) form the 
naturalia of such a contract.28 They automatically apply to such a contract, 
irrespective of the intention of the parties (that is, irrespective of whether or 
not the parties chose to expressly include such terms), although they can 
sometimes be excluded by the parties by agreement (usually by means of an 
exemption clause – compare the voetstoots clause in the contract of sale). 
However, some naturalia may not be open to exclusion by agreement of the 
parties (compare sections 49(1) and 51(1) of the Consumer Protection Act 
68 of 2008). The implied duty of fair dealing in the employment contract, it will 
be argued in this piece, is one of the naturalia of that contract, and its 
purported exclusion by the parties would be against public policy and 
                                            
comprehensive, guaranteeing fairness in probably the broadest imaginable range of 
practices and conduct covered by labour law. 
27  See the discussion in Part 4. 
28  See Van Huyssteen, Lubbe and Reinecke Contract 9.124. 
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unconstitutional (as it constitutes a term implied by law in order to give effect 
to the Bill of Rights, and specifically the constitutional right to fair labour 
practices, as will be discussed below). This piece will focus on the cases 
where the courts (specifically the SCA) have embarked on such development 
of the common law through the recognition of this role for fairness in the 
employment context.  
There are, however, two significant qualifications in respect of the role of the 
courts in developing the common law in this way. The first is the principle of 
constitutional avoidance. The second relates to judicial deference to the 
legislature in giving effect to constitutional rights. And I would suggest that 
both of these principles are important for the purposes of the topic under 
discussion here. In a nutshell, constitutional avoidance forbids a claimant to 
rely directly on a constitutional right if legislation is in place which gives effect 
to that right. In casu, this relates to claimants being constrained to bring 
claims in terms of the relevant provisions of the labour legislation (for 
example, section 185 of the LRA in the case of an unfair dismissal) rather 
than directly through recourse to the constitutional right to fair labour 
practices. Constitutional (or judicial) deference relates to the courts' 
sensitivity to the constitutional principle of the separation of powers in order 
to respect the legislature's role in giving effect to constitutional rights.29 In 
essence, how judicial deference features in the present context is that 
opponents of the development of the common law employment contract in 
order to include notions of fairness frequently criticise such judicial 
development on the grounds that it ignores or negates the policy 
considerations behind the fairness provisions of the legislation (and thus 
circumvents legislative protection contrary to the legislature's intention). It is 
especially in the context of (unfair) dismissal that this issue arises, and where 
critics have been vocal about the need for claimants to follow the route of the 
legislative dispute resolution and adjudication system rather than to bring 
claims for breach of contract before the civil courts. This last will be 
specifically considered in Part 3.  
I will argue in section 3 below in favour of the judicial development of the 
common law in the SCA judgments. But in the process, the evaluation of the 
very specific question of the recognition of an implied duty of fair dealing in 
                                            
29  Klaasen explains it as follows: "The Constitutional Court subscribes to a standard of 
'deference' in judicial review. The principle of deference concerns the function of the 
judge in mediating between the law and legislative and executive politics. The principle 
recognises the need to protect the institutional character of each of the three arms of 
government in a manner that will prevent their ability to discharge their constitutional 
role being undermined." Klaasen 2015 PELJ 1901. 
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the employment contract will undoubtedly raise more general questions 
regarding our labour law landscape and especially the interaction between 
the sources of law, particularly legislation and the common law. This issue of 
the interaction of rights and remedies from these sources is crucial to an 
understanding of our single system of law subject to the Constitution, in order 
to give effect to the Bill of Rights. And, to my mind, such a conception of a 
single system eschews a parochial "rating" of common law and legislative 
rights and remedies, and rather calls for an inclusive and unifying 
understanding of how different sources of law may – or must – collectively 
(and in a supplementary manner) pursue the achievement of constitutional 
objectives. As Kollapen AJ recently observed: 
The inclusion of labour rights in the Bill of Rights signalled a significant and 
seismic development in the recognition of the rights of workers. However, in 
much the same way, the Bill of Rights recognises the existence, on equal 
footing, of a host of other rights and it does so not on the basis that rights are 
hierarchical but rather on the basis that they are interdependent, interwoven 
and mutually reinforcing.30 
As already said, the debate about an implied term of fairness in the 
employment contract appears to have died down of late, and I will call for it 
to be reopened and re-energised. And I believe that this also calls for further 
debate on the broader issue of the continuing interaction between legislation 
and contract. 
3 "Fair dealing" in the common law employment contract: 
the courts and academic commentary 
South African courts recognise the existence of an implied term of trust and 
confidence in the employment contract like that recognised in a number of 
other common-law jurisdictions.31 In the United Kingdom (UK) case before 
                                            
30  In the Gaoshubelwe case para 150.  
31  Certainty about the status of judicial recognition (and the exact content) of this implied 
term seems to differ from jurisdiction to jurisdiction. In the UK, the implied duty was 
clearly recognised in Malik v Bank of Credit and Commerce SA 1998 AC 20 (HL) 
(hereafter the Malik case), but the scope of the duty was limited in Johnson v Unisys 
Ltd 2003 AC 518 (HL) to exclude matters relating to the termination of the employment 
contract (dismissal). There is case authority in support of recognising the duty in 
Singapore (see Chandran 2015 S Ac LJ 31-54), Hong Kong, New Zealand and 
Malaysia (see Chandran 2015 S Ac LJ 46). In Canada, the courts appear to have 
come short of recognising such a duty in line with the UK position (the majority of the 
court in Wallace v United Grain Growers 1997 3 SCR 701 declined to recognise an 
implied term not to be unfairly dismissed), but the courts have given content to an 
implied duty on Canadian employers to treat employees with decency, civility, respect, 
and dignity, which duty may especially be implicated in cases of employer bullying 
(see Doorey 2005 Queen's LJ 500-559). In Australia, the High Court rejected 
recognition of such a duty in Commonwealth Bank of Australia v Barker 2014 HCA 32. 
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the House of Lords of Malik v Bank of Credit and Commerce International 
SA,32 Lord Nicholls of Birkenhead formulated the content of this duty as 
imposing an obligation that an employer "would not, without reasonable and 
proper cause, conduct itself in a manner likely to destroy or seriously damage 
the relationship of confidence and trust between employer and employee".33 
Cohen explains the raison d'etre and working of this duty as follows: 
Whilst the law has traditionally recognised the employee's duty to serve the 
employer loyally and faithfully, modern thinking accepts that this obligation 
assumes a mutual dimension in terms of which both employer and employee 
are required to conduct themselves in a manner that is not likely to damage or 
destroy the employment relationship. This obligation is referred to as the 
obligation of mutual trust and confidence or fair dealing. In terms of this 
obligation contracting parties are required to have regard to the interests of the 
other party without subjugating their own, in recognition of the fact that the 
continued and harmonious relationship between employer and employee is 
imperative for the successful fulfilment of the employment contract. By imposing 
a broad set of behavioural standards for employers and employees the implied 
obligation forms both a 'core common law duty which dictates how employees 
should be treated during the course of the employment relationship' and a rule 
of construction in terms of which all the obligations of the contract can be 
interpreted and understood. The implied obligation of mutual trust and 
confidence thus ensures that the employer's interests in deriving the maximum 
benefit from his or her business are equitably balanced against the interests of 
the employee in being treated fairly.34 
In Council for Scientific & Industrial Research v Fijen35 the then Appellate 
Division recognised that this common-law duty also forms part of the South 
African employment contract.36 As Bosch points out, the court held that the 
duty is reciprocal and the court suggested that it was more a naturalia 
contractus than an implied term (that is, it is not derived from the intention of 
the parties or inferred from the facts, but rather a term implied ex lege, which 
                                            
32  The Malik case. 
33  Malik case 35.  
34  Cohen 2012 Acta Juridica 94-95. 
35  Council for Scientific & Industrial Research v Fijen 1996 17 ILJ 18 (A) (hereafter the 
Fijen case). 
36  At the Fijen case 20B-D the court held as follows: "It is well established that the 
relationship between employer and employee is in essence one of trust and 
confidence and that, at common law, conduct clearly inconsistent therewith entitles 
the 'innocent' party to cancel the agreement. On this basis our law is the same as that 
of English law, namely that in every contract of employment there is a duty that the 
employer will not, without reasonable and probable cause, conduct itself in a manner 
calculated or likely to destroy or seriously damage the relationship of confidence and 
trust between the parties. This duty may be breached without the intention to repudiate 
the contract. It is sufficient if the effect of the employer's conduct as a whole, judged 
reasonably and sensibly, is such that the employee cannot be expected to put up with 
it. A reciprocal duty also rests on the employee. However, in our law, it is not necessary 
to work with the concept of an implied term. The duties referred to simply flow from 
naturalia contractus." 
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arises due to the existence of an employment contract).37 Bosch in fact 
suggests that the term should be viewed as an essentialium of the 
employment contract, as without it the contract would not be one of 
employment. With reference to Barmes,38 Cohen describes the impact of the 
mutual duty as follows (highlighting the importance of this duty in the context 
of the employment contract as a relational contract): 
[T]he implied obligation of mutual trust and confidence is responsible for the 
recognition of behavioural standards and commitments arising out of the 
employment relationship. In terms of this obligation contracting parties are 
required to have regard to, yet not subjugate their own interests to, the interests 
of the other party. This is in recognition of the fact that the continued and 
harmonious inter-relationship of the employer and employee is imperative for 
the successful fulfilment of the employment contract.39 
The courts (including the SCA40 and the Labour Appeal Court41) and 
academic commentators42 have subsequently confirmed the recognition of 
the implied term of trust and confidence in Fijen and its application to 
employment contracts. However, even in the light of the judicial recognition 
of this implied term in employment contracts, the debate about the continued 
availability of common-law remedies in employment disputes (outside of the 
legislative scheme of labour rights) seemed to throw a spanner in the works 
in the mid-to-late 2000s. Employers faced with breach of contract claims 
resorted to raising special pleas regarding the jurisdiction of the civil courts 
to hear such matters (especially in cases involving the termination of 
employment by an employer). Recourse by claimants to the mutual duty of 
trust and confidence as an implied term of the employment contract would be 
problematic if the courts were to follow a line of diminishing the role of the 
contract in favour of access, exclusively, to the legislative remedies. The SCA 
was called upon to provide clarity on this by considering the proper role for 
the civil courts and the common law of contract in the context of employment-
related disputes in the light of the extensive legislative regulation of this 
relationship.  
In Fedlife the majority of the SCA, by way of Nugent AJA, confirmed that the 
codification of rights and remedies relating to unfair dismissal in Chapter VIII 
of the LRA did not deprive employees of their common-law remedies in the 
                                            
37  Bosch 2006 ILJ 28. 
38  Barmes 2007 ILJ (UK) 41. 
39  Cohen 2009 ILJ 2282. 
40  The Murray case. 
41  See Jooste v Transnet Ltd t/a South African Airways 1995 16 ILJ 629 (LAC); South 
African Revenue Services v Commission for Conciliation Mediation and Arbitration 
2014 35 ILJ 656 (LAC). 
42  See Bosch 2006 ILJ 28; Van Jaarsveld 2007 SA Merc LJ 204. 
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event of the termination of employment by an employer (in that case, in the 
specific context of the premature termination of a fixed-term contract). The 
court's exposition of the "dual avenues" of labour disputes (disputes to 
enforce "LRA rights", such as the right not to be unfairly dismissed or the right 
not to be subjected to unfair labour practices, on the one hand, and disputes 
based on the breach of contract under the common law, on the other hand) 
is less important for the present purposes. What is important for this 
discussion is that both the majority and the minority in Fedlife saw fit to 
include statements regarding the constitutional development of the common 
law of the employment contract in respect of the importation of fairness into 
the contract, outside of the influence of the provisions of the labour legislation. 
Nugent AJA had the following to say: 
The clear purpose of the legislature when it introduced a remedy against unfair 
dismissal in 1979 was to supplement the common law rights of an employee 
whose employment might be lawfully terminated at the will of the employer 
(whether upon notice or summarily for breach). It was to provide an additional 
right to an employee whose employment might be terminated lawfully but in 
circumstances that were nevertheless unfair. That position was perhaps 
ameliorated with the adoption of the Interim Constitution in 1994 which 
guaranteed to every person the right to fair labour practices in s 27(1) and 
rendered invalid any law inconsistent with its terms (which has been repeated 
in the present Constitution). Thus it might be that an implied right not to be 
unfairly dismissed was imported into the common law employment relationship 
by s 27(1) of the Interim Constitution (and now by s 23(1) of the present 
Constitution) even before the 1995 Act was enacted.43 
Froneman AJA, in his minority judgment, expressed similar sentiments on the 
subject: 
In my view the Constitution has a material impact on [the] particular conceptual 
distinction between the proper domain of contract and that of the statute, 
namely that the former has little to do with fairness, whilst only the latter has (I 
must emphasize that I am dealing only with the contract of employment and 
labour legislation – what effect the Constitution may have on the law of contract 
generally, or other legislation, is not relevant for present purposes). Section 
23(1) of the Constitution provides that everyone has the right to fair labour 
practices. It seems to me almost incontestable that one of the most important 
manifestations of the right to fair labour practices that developed in labour 
relations in this country was the right not to be unfairly dismissed. Had the Act 
not been enacted with the express object to give effect to the constitutional right 
to fair labour practices (amongst others), the courts would have been obliged, 
in my view, to develop the common law to give expression to this constitutional 
right in terms of section 39(2) of the Constitution. To the extent that the Act 
might not fully give effect to and regulate that right, that obligation on ordinary 
civil courts remains.44  
                                            
43  The majority judgment of Nugent AJA (Howie JA, Mpati JA and Marais JA concurring) 
in the Fedlife case paras 13-14. Emphasis added. 
44  Froneman AJA's minority judgment in the Fedlife case para 4. Emphasis added. 
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Both these statements relate to the importation of fairness into the common-
law contract, derived from the fair labour practice guarantee in the 
Constitution. While both refer specifically to the right not to be unfairly 
dismissed, by definition they would also apply to the right not to be subjected 
to unfair labour practices (of which unfair dismissal is arguably the worst 
form). Accordingly, both statements would appear to allude, more broadly, to 
a right to fair treatment in employment, something that would appear to be a 
natural evolution of the implied duty of trust and confidence in the 
constitutional dispensation. Nugent AJA expresses the view that such an 
importation of fairness into the common law by way of the Constitution might 
already have taken place before the enactment of the LRA. Froneman AJA, 
on the other hand, stresses that such a development of the common law 
would have had to be undertaken by the courts had the LRA not been 
enacted. Both see this process as inevitable. What is of particular interest is 
that Froneman AJA adds that "[t]o the extent that the [LRA] might not fully 
give effect to and regulate [the section 23 right to fair labour practices], that 
obligation on civil courts remains". More will be said on this later, in the 
discussion of the role of constitutional avoidance and judicial deference in 
this context.45  
Following Fedlife, the SCA continued along the path of recognising the 
importation of fairness into the common-law employment contract under the 
influence of the Constitution. Whilst what had been said in this regard in 
Fedlife (as quoted above) had been couched in rather speculative language, 
this court now started to make more definite pronouncements on the issue. 
In Old Mutual Life Assurance Co SA Ltd v Gumbi46 Jafta JA stated that "It is 
clear … that coordinate rights [to the right to a pre-dismissal hearing under 
the old LRA] are now protected by the common law: to the extent necessary, 
as developed under the constitutional imperative (s 39(2)) to harmonise the 
common law into the Bill of Rights (which itself includes the right to fair labour 
practices."47 Gumbi was followed a fortnight later by the SCA's judgment in 
Boxer Superstores Mthatha v Mbenya,48 where Cameron JA (relying on 
Gumbi) held that "the common-law contract of employment has been 
developed in accordance with the Constitution to include the right to a pre-
dismissal hearing … This means that every employee now has a common 
                                            
45  In section 2.3 in Part 3. See, generally, discussion in Bosch 2008 Stell LR 374. 
46  Old Mutual Life Assurance Co SA Ltd v Gumbi 2007 5 SA 552 (SCA) (hereafter the 
Gumbi case). 
47  Gumbi case para 5. 
48  Boxer Superstores Mthatha v Mbenya 2007 5 SA 450 (SCA) (hereafter the Boxer 
Superstores case). 
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law contractual claim – not merely a statutory unfair labour practice right – to 
a pre-dismissal hearing."49 
Less than a year later, the SCA's trend of recognising the constitutional 
development of the common law to import fairness into the employment 
relationship continued in Murray, which involved a common-law claim of 
constructive dismissal brought by an employee who was not covered by the 
LRA. (As the plaintiff was a member of the SA National Defence Force, he 
was excluded from the ambit of the Act.50) In the absence of LRA protection 
the parties agreed in argument that the plaintiff was entitled to rely directly on 
the Bill of Rights (the section 23 right to fair labour practices, and the section 
10 right to dignity). Cameron JA, however, believed that direct reliance on the 
relevant fundamental rights was not necessary: 
However, it is in my view best to understand the impact of these rights on this 
case through the constitutional development of the common law contract of 
employment. This contract has always imposed mutual obligations of 
confidence and trust between employer and employee. Developed as it must 
be to promote the spirit, purport and objects of the Bill of Rights, the common 
law of employment must be held to impose on all employers a duty of fair 
dealing at all times with their employees – even those the LRA does not cover. 
This case involves the particular application of that duty where the employee 
terminates the contract of service.51  
Here we find the single most direct and I would suggest unequivocal52 
acceptance by the SCA of the recognition of an implied duty of fair dealing in 
the common-law employment contract, derived from the constitutional right 
to fair labour practices.53 The wording is interesting, especially the last part 
of the highlighted section above. Section 8(3) of the Bill of Rights obliges 
courts to constitutionally develop the common law to the extent that 
legislation does not give effect to a particular fundamental right. Some would 
argue (as Wallis AJA later did in McKenzie)54 that the enactment of the LRA, 
and more specifically Chapter VIII of the Act, obviates the need for the 
development of the common law, as the Act already gives effect to the section 
23 right and imports fairness into the employment relationship.55 But this 
                                            
49  Boxer Superstores case para 6. 
50  Section 2 of the Labour Relations Act 66 of 1995 (hereafter the LRA). 
51  Murray case paras 5-6. Emphasis added. 
52  As Van Niekerk J agreed, in the Mogothle case para 24. 
53  As Paul Benjamin states in respect of the import of this dictum, "Murray contains the 
broadest statement of the impact of the Constitution on the contract of employment." 
See Benjamin 2009 ILJ 758.  
54  See the discussion in Part 2. 
55  Also see Mohlaka v Minister of Finance 2009 30 ILJ 622 (LC). 
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would seem to ignore the clear wording of Cameron JA's dictum, which I will 
repeat here for the sake of clarity: 
This contract has always imposed mutual obligations of confidence and trust 
between employer and employee ... the common law of employment must be 
held to impose on all employers a duty of fair dealing at all times with their 
employees – even those the LRA does not cover. 
It is clear that Cameron JA was of the opinion that the constitutional 
development of the common law to imply a duty of fair dealing is not confined 
only to cases where the LRA does not apply, and that the development which 
he declares has already taken place is universal in its application to 
employment contracts (including those covered by the LRA). And the 
judgment in Murray served to concretise and expand on the earlier notion of 
the importation of fairness into the common law. While Gumbi and Boxer 
Superstores involved recognition, very specifically, of an implied right to a 
pre-dismissal hearing, Murray grounded the importation of fairness in the 
implied duty of trust and confidence, while expanding its application and 
scope to equate to a much broader duty of fair dealing which permeates the 
entire relationship.  
The Labour Court, in Mogothle v Premier of the Northwest Province, followed 
the judgment of Cameron JA in Murray. Van Niekerk J considered the 
findings of the respective courts in Boxer Superstores, Gumbi and Murray, 
and concluded as follows:  
[T]he SCA has unequivocally established a contractual right to fair dealing that 
binds all employers, a right that may be enforced by all employees both in 
relation to substance and procedure, and which exists independently of any 
statutory protection against unfair dismissal and unfair labour practices … As 
controversial as the judgments in Gumbi, Boxer Superstores and Murray might 
be as a matter of law or policy, they unequivocally acknowledge a common-law 
contractual obligation on an employer to act fairly in its dealings with employees. 
This obligation has both a substantive and a procedural dimension. In 
determining the nature and extent of the mutual obligation of fair dealing as 
between employer and employee, the court must be guided by the unfair 
dismissal and unfair labour practice jurisprudence developed over the years.56 
A further hint at judicial acceptance (by the SCA) that such a development of 
the common-law contract in line with Cameron JA's view above has taken 
                                            
56  The Mogothle case paras 24, 30. The Labour Court later rejected these views in 
Manamela v Department of Cooperative Governance, Human Settlement and 
Traditional Affairs, Limpopo Province (CJHB) unreported case number 1886/2013 of 
5 September 2013. 
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place can be found in Nugent JA's following statement in Denel (Pty) Ltd v 
Vorster:57 
If the new constitutional dispensation did have the effect of introducing into the 
employment relationship a reciprocal duty to act fairly, it does not follow that it 
deprives contractual terms of their effect. Such implied duties would operate to 
ameliorate the effect of unfair terms in the contract, or even to supplement the 
contractual terms where necessary, but not to deprive a fair contract of its legal 
effect.58 
And, of course, bearing in mind Froneman AJA's earlier-quoted dictum in 
Fedlife, the civil courts retain the ongoing obligation to develop the common 
law to the extent that the LRA does not fully give effect to the right to fair 
labour practices. It will be argued later that there are cases where the Act 
fails in this regard, and that the common law provides the vehicle to address 
such cases in line with the section 23 right. 
Academic writers have been divided on the issue of the recognition of a 
common-law duty of fair dealing in the employment contract. Proponents 
such as Cohen59 and Bosch60 have argued in favour of such recognition with 
reference to the relational nature of the employment contract and the 
significant reach of the implied term of trust and confidence, which already 
enjoys recognition by the courts. Others, such as Du Toit, are less 
enthusiastic about an implied term incorporating fairness in the employment 
contract: 
Judges are left to make critical decisions based on their personal interpretation 
of open-ended contractual rights and duties, such as 'fair dealing' or 'trust and 
confidence', much as the Industrial Court was at large to give meaning to the 
meaning of 'unfair labour practice'. It does not seem right.61  
Du Toit mainly laments the dual avenues of labour dispute resolution 
established by the SCA, and his apparent critical stance towards the 
recognition of a duty of fair dealing should probably be read in that context. 
Benjamin is critical of the duty of fair dealing for a number of reasons. Firstly, 
he is of the opinion that the relevant SCA judgments, which dealt with the 
importation of fairness into the common-law contract (Gumbi, Boxer 
Superstores and Murray), were too brief in their consideration of the 
legislative scheme of labour law regulation.62 More specifically, he poses the 
                                            
57  Denel (Pty) Ltd v Vorster 2004 4 SA 481 (SCA) (hereafter the Denel case). 
58  Denel case para 16. 
59  See Cohen 2009 ILJ 2271; Cohen 2010 SA Merc LJ 417.  
60  See Bosch 2006 ILJ 28. 
61  Du Toit 2010 ILJ 41. 
62  He remarks: "While Murray is more detailed in its discussion of the evolution of labour 
law [than Gumbi and Boxer Superstores], this is more or less confined to the evolution 
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question whether such a general formulation of a duty of fair dealing was 
intended to cover all aspects of the employment relationship (which, he 
suggests, would blur the line between interest and rights disputes, and ignore 
or negate the fact that the legislature chose only to enshrine protection 
against specified forms of unfair conduct by employers in the legislation).63 
Secondly, he believes that the notion implicit in such a duty of fair dealing, 
namely the focus on the fairness of employer’s conduct vis a vis employees, 
is out of step with "the factor that dominated [the SCA's] considerations in 
Sidumo — the importance of being fair to employers. The SCA does not find 
it necessary to ask what the impact of the duty of "fair dealing" is on the 
"function of management".64 Of course, the SCA's judgment in Sidumo did 
not survive scrutiny by the Constitutional Court. And this last point would 
seem to ignore the fact that Murray's duty of fair dealing is a reciprocal duty, 
which may also protect employers from unfair employee conduct (something 
I will return to in Part 3). All in all, it seems that Benjamin's criticism of Murray's 
duty of fair dealing relates more to the rather glib way in which the SCA came 
to the formulation of such an important concept (without evidence of the 
detailed consideration of policy considerations regarding (the) labour dispute 
resolution system(s) and the extent to which it is desirable that laws should 
regulate the employment relationship), while at the same time the author also 
expresses the more positive view that such a duty could be harnessed to 
assist the plight of vulnerable workers ("[t]he trilogy [of Gumbi, Boxer 
Superstores and Murray] may therefore provide an opportunity for inventive 
litigation on behalf of the vulnerable and unprotected workers outside of the 
LRA as well as those employed by labour brokers (temporary employment 
services").65  
This academic commentary preceded the SCA's oft noted "final say on the 
matter" in 2010. This occurred in SA Maritime Safety Authority v McKenzie. 
                                            
of constructive dismissal, the specific ground on which Murray sought relief. A more 
comprehensive examination of the LRA's legislative schema should have been 
undertaken before articulating a duty of fair dealing in such all-encompassing terms." 
Benjamin 2009 ILJ 760. 
63  He remarks: "The assumption underlying Murray that every decision made by an 
employer must be procedurally and substantively fair is not an accurate description of 
the current labour law regime: numerous categories of decisions — those that do not 
involve dismissal, a specified unfair labour practice or a prohibited act such as 
discrimination — are beyond the scope of legal regulation. This is the distinction 
between disputes of right which are resolved by adjudication and disputes of interest 
which are resolved through negotiation (whether collective or individual) and industrial 
action (if collective bargaining fails). Does the new duty of fair dealing extend to both 
categories of rights?" Benjamin 2009 ILJ 759-760. 
64  Benjamin 2009 ILJ 759. 
65  Benjamin 2009 ILJ 764. 
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4 Conclusion to Part 1 
In Part 2 of this piece I will critically evaluate the McKenzie judgment, in order 
to determine whether it overturned the Murray judgment in respect of its 
recognition of the constitutionally-developed common-law duty of fair dealing. 
I will then pose the question of where we are currently, after McKenzie, in 
respect of the role of fairness in the employment relationship under the 
common-law employment contract. 
In Part 3 I will consider arguments for and against the recognition of the 
implied duty of fair dealing, and I will conclude the evaluation after 
considering the issues within the broader context of the role of good faith and 
substantive fairness in the general common law of contract. 
Bibliography 
Literature 
Barnes 2007 ILJ (UK) 
Barmes L "Common Law Implied Terms and Behavioural Standards at Work" 
2007 ILJ (UK) 35-50 
Benjamin 2009 ILJ 
Benjamin P "Braamfontein versus Bloemfontein: The SCA and Constitutional 
Court's Approaches to Labour Law" 2009 ILJ 757-771 
Bosch 2006 ILJ 
Bosch C "The Implied Term of Trust and Confidence in South African Labour 
Law" 2006 ILJ 28-47 
Bosch 2008 Stell LR 
Bosch C "Bent Out of Shape? Critically Assessing the Application of the Right 
to Fair Labour Practices in Developing South African Labour Law" 2008 Stell 
LR 374-389 
Chandran 2015 S Ac LJ 
Chandran R "Fate of Trust and Confidence in Employment Contracts" 2015 
S Ac LJ 31-54 
Cohen 2009 ILJ 
Cohen T "Implying Fairness into the Employment Contract" 2009 ILJ 2271-
2295  
AM LOUW PART 1 PER / PELJ 2018 (21)  22 
Cohen 2010 SA Merc LJ 
Cohen T "Jurisdiction over Employment Disputes – Light at the End of the 
Tunnel?" 2010 SA Merc LJ 417-428 
Cohen 2012 Acta Juridica 
Cohen T "The Relational Contract of Employment" 2012 Acta Juridica 84-101 
Doorey 2005 Queen's LJ 
Doorey DJ "Employer 'Bullying': Implied Duties of Fair Dealing in Canadian 
Employment Contracts" 2005 Queen's LJ 500-559 
Du Toit 2008 SALJ 
Du Toit D "Oil on Troubled Waters? The Slippery Interface between the 
Contract of Employment and Statutory Labour Law" 2008 SALJ 95-133 
Du Toit 2010 ILJ 
Du Toit D "A Common-Law Hydra Emerges from the Forum-Shopping 
Swamp" 2010 ILJ 21-45 
Klaasen 2015 PELJ 
Klaasen A "Public Litigation and the Concept of 'Deference' in Judicial 
Review" 2015 PELJ 1901-1929 
Van Eck and Mathiba 2014 ILJ 
Van Eck BPS and Mathiba MK "Constitution Seventeenth Amendment Act: 
Thoughts on the Jurisdictional Overlap, the Restoration of the Labour Appeal 
Court and the Demotion of the Supreme Court of Appeal" 2014 ILJ 863-879 
Van Huyssteen, Lubbe and Reinecke Contract 
Van Huyssteen LF, Lubbe GF and Reinecke MFB Contract: General 
Principles 5th ed (Juta Cape Town 2016) 
Van Jaarsveld 2007 SA Merc LJ 
Van Jaarsveld M "An Employee's Contractual Obligation to Promote 
Harmonious Relationships in the Workplace - When are the Stakes too High? 
Some Pointers from the Judiciary" 2007 SA Merc LJ 204-216 
Van Niekerk and Smit Law@Work 
Van Niekerk A and Smit N (eds) Law@Work 3rd ed (LexisNexis Durban 2015) 
Van Staden and Smit 2010 TSAR 
Van Staden M and Smit N "The Regulation of the Employment Relationship 
and the Re-emergence of the Contract of Employment" 2010 TSAR 702-719 
AM LOUW PART 1 PER / PELJ 2018 (21)  23 
Case law 
Bato Star Fishing (Pty) Ltd v Minister of Environmental Affairs and Tourism 
2004 4 SA 490 (CC) 
Boxer Superstores Mthatha v Mbenya 2007 5 SA 450 (SCA) 
Chirwa v Transnet 2008 4 SA 367 (CC) 
Commonwealth Bank of Australia v Barker 2014 HCA 32 
Council for Scientific & Industrial Research v Fijen 1996 17 ILJ 18 (A) 
Denel (Pty) Ltd v Vorster 2004 4 SA 481 (SCA) 
Fedlife Assurance Ltd v Wolfaardt 2002 1 SA 49 (SCA) 
Food and Allied Workers Union obo Gaoshubelwe v Pieman's Pantry (Pty) 
Limited 2018 5 BCLR 527 (CC) 
Johnson v Unisys Ltd 2003 AC 518 (HL) 
Jooste v Transnet Ltd t/a South African Airways 1995 16 ILJ 629 (LAC) 
KwaZulu-Natal Tourism Authority v Wasa 2016 37 ILJ 2581 (LAC) 
Lufuno Mphaphuli & Associates (Pty) Ltd v Andrews 2009 4 SA 529 (CC) 
Makhanya v University of Zululand 2009 30 ILJ 1539 (SCA) 
Malik v Bank of Credit and Commerce SA 1998 AC 20 (HL) 
Manamela v Department of Cooperative Governance, Human Settlement 
and Traditional Affairs, Limpopo Province (CJHB) unreported case number 
1886/2013 of 5 September 2013 
Mogothle v Premier of the Northwest Province 2009 30 ILJ 605 (LC) 
Mohlaka v Minister of Finance 2009 30 ILJ 622 (LC) 
Murray v Minister of Defence 2009 3 SA 130 (SCA) 
Nakin v MEC Department of Education, Eastern Cape Province 2008 6 SA 
320 (Ck) 
Old Mutual Life Assurance Co SA Ltd v Gumbi 2007 5 SA 552 (SCA) 
AM LOUW PART 1 PER / PELJ 2018 (21)  24 
Pretorius v Transnet Pension Fund (CC) unreported case number CCT95/17 
of 25 April 2018 
Ramabulana v Pilansberg Platinum Mines 2015 36 ILJ 2333 (LC) 
Randwater v Stoop 2013 34 ILJ 579 (LAC) 
SA Maritime Safety Authority v McKenzie 2010 3 SA 601 (SCA) 
South African Football Association v Mangope 2013 34 ILJ 311 (LAC) 
South African Police Service v Solidarity obo Barnard 2014 6 SA 123 (CC) 
South African Revenue Services v Commission for Conciliation Mediation 
and Arbitration 2014 35 ILJ 656 (LAC) 
Wallace v United Grain Growers 1997 3 SCR 701 
Legislation 
Basic Conditions of Employment Act 75 of 1997 
Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996 
Constitution Seventeenth Amendment Act of 2012 
Consumer Protection Act 68 of 2008 
Employment Equity Act 55 of 1998 
Labour Relations Act 66 of 1995 
Promotion of Administrative Justice Act 3 of 2000 
List of Abbreviations 
BCEA Basic Conditions of Employment Act 75 of 1997 
CCMA Commission for Conciliation, Mediation and Arbitration 
EEA Employment Equity Act 55 of 1998 
ILJ Industrial Law Journal 
ILJ (UK) Industrial Law Journal (United Kingdom) 
LRA Labour Relations Act 66 of 1995 
PAJA Promotion of Administrative Justice Act 3 of 2000 
PELJ Potchefstroom Electronic Law Journal 
Queen's LJ Queen's Law Journal 
AM LOUW PART 1 PER / PELJ 2018 (21)  25 
S Ac LJ Singapore Academy of Law Journal 
SA Merc LJ South African Mercantile Law Journal  
SALJ South African Law Journal 
SCA Supreme Court of Appeal 
Stell LR Stellenbosch Law Review 
TSAR Tydskrif vir die Suid-Afrikaanse Reg 
UK United Kingdom 
 
 
